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Abstract. Over the last years, threat intelligence sharing has steadily
grown, leading cybersecurity professionals to access increasingly larger
amounts of heterogeneous data. Among those, cyber attacks’ Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) have proven to be particularly valu-
able to characterize threat actors’ behaviors and, thus, improve defensive
countermeasures. Unfortunately, this information is often hidden within
human-readable textual reports and must be extracted manually. In this
paper, we evaluate several classification approaches to automatically re-
trieve TTPs from unstructured text. To implement these approaches,
we take advantage of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, an open knowl-
edge base of adversarial tactics and techniques, to train classifiers and
label results. Finally, we present rcATT, a tool built on top of our find-
ings and freely distributed to the security community to support cyber
threat report automated analysis.
Keywords: Automation · Cyber Threat Intelligence · ATT&CK Tactics
and Techniques · Multi-Label Classification
1 Introduction
According to Gartner, Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) can be generally iden-
tified as any piece of information corresponding to “evidence-based knowledge
(...) about an existing or emerging menace”[9]. Despite lacking a precise def-
inition that comprehensively describes its properties, the security community
generally agrees on differentiating among three main types of CTI: “tactical”,
“operational” and “strategical”. Tactical CTI refers to information that is a
direct manifestation of adversary actions within a compromised system; exam-
ples are IP addresses, file hashes and other artifacts that are traces of actual
malicious activities. Operational CTI relates to more general information that
has an impact on day-to-day security decision making; for instance statistics
of ongoing cyberattack campaigns requiring security teams to deploy specific
countermeasures. Finally, strategic CTI refers to knowledge about threat actors’
capabilities and motivations, such as characteristics and behavior of advanced
persistent threats.
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Over the last year, the sharing of these three types of CTI has steadily
grown. Threat information sources have increased in number, supported by the
development of standardized technologies and formats, like STIX [3]. Available
information is either open source and freely accessible over the Internet or se-
lectively provided within private feeds managed by specialized companies, like
IBM X Force [13] and OTX AlienVault [1].
It is worth noting that the amount of shared information is not equally
distributed among the three types of CTI. In fact, most sharing activities involve
tactical CTI in the form of Indicators of Compromise (IOCs). Malicious IPs and
URLs as well as signatures of malware executables cover the vast majority of CTI
exchanges while operational and, especially, strategic CTI corresponds to almost
negligible percentages despite their importance [7]. Furthermore, operational and
strategic CTI does not usually come within structured formats but is embedded
within human-readable cyber threat reports (CTRs). If structured data can be
generally handled simply by using web scrapers and parsers, unstructured data
almost always requires security experts to read and manually extract the most
relevant information. Considering the number of CTRs published each day,3
dealing with unstructured security information currently remains a cumbersome
task.
Our work aims to overcome this challenging task by simplifying the extraction
of valuable security information contained in CTRs, namely cyber threats’ Tac-
tics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). To achieve this, we use the ATT&CK
(Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge) framework [23], an
open knowledge base of adversarial tactics and techniques, and we aim at la-
belling each CTR with the TTPs that most likely match its content. Automat-
ing this labeling allows security experts to use the information within any given
CTR more efficiently and thus support the definition of prevention, detection
and mitigation methods for the related threats. Our contribution specifically
focuses on three main aspects:
– We implement and evaluate standard multi-label text classification models
and adapt them to retrieve ATT&CK tactics and techniques from CTRs;
– We test several post-processing techniques based on the hierarchical struc-
ture of the ATT&CK framework to enhance classification results;
– We present and distribute rcATT,4 a tool based on our findings that: 1. pre-
dicts ATT&CK tactics and techniques related to a given CTR, 2. allows the
user to correct predictions and give feedback on the classification engine to
improve results over time, and 3. outputs the results using the Structured
Threat Information eXpression (STIX) format.
Finally, we provide a comparison with available open-source solutions showing
rcATT’s improvements over the state of the art.
3 IBM X Force and OTX AlienVault alone have an average of 15 new reports per day.
4 https://github.com/vlegoy/rcATT
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2 ATT&CK framework
MITRE ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge)
framework [23] is a “globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and
techniques based on real-world observations”. Its comprehensive collection of
tactics and techniques has gained popularity over recent years and has been
integrated into popular threat information sharing technologies [3].
ATT&CK provides a structured taxonomy to describe several different ad-
versary behaviours. It formally divides into three “technology domains”:
– “Enterprise”, which describes behaviours on standard IT systems (e.g., Linux,
Windows).
– “Mobile”, which focuses on mobile devices (e.g., Android, iOS).
– “ICS”, which relates to industrial control and, more in general, to cyber-
physical systems
Beyond these domains, ATT&CK also documents behaviours for reconnaissance
and weaponisation under the “PRE-ATT&CK” designation. Although our work
applies likewise to every domain, we will focus this paper on the ATT&CK
“Enterprise”.
The “Enterprise” ATT&CK framework is usually represented as a matrix of
tactics and techniques where:
– the tactics represent possible goals of an attacker (e.g., “Initial Access”,
“Privilege Escalation”, etc.)
– the techniques identify “how” an attacker might fulfill a specific goal (e.g.,
“Access Token Manipulation”, “Accessibility Features”, etc.)
Tactics and techniques are the key focus of our work as they will correspond
to the labels of our classification.
Each technique is associated with one or more tactics. Furthermore, the “En-
terprise” ATT&CK framework collects information about recorded adversary use
of every available technique (e.g., involved threat actors, notorious malware, etc.)
and possible mitigation approaches. All this information will be used to train
our classifiers.
2.1 Data Characterization
The actual ATT&CK data employed in our work is stored on GitHub5 and
represented using the STIX 2.0 format [3].
Figure 1 shows the structure of the employed dataset and emphasizes the
relationships linking all available information to the related tactics and tech-
niques. Every piece of information includes several external references (e.g., usu-
ally threat reports or technical descriptions). All text linked by these references
was considered part of the dataset and used to train the classifiers.
5 https://github.com/mitre/cti/tree/master/enterprise-attack, accessed
February 2020
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Fig. 1: “Enterprise” ATT&CK data schema and corresponding STIX 2.0 objects
Overall, the “Enterprise” ATT&CK dataset is enriched by 1490 different
security reports either in HTML (1311) or in PDF (179) format. We handled
and parsed documents in PDF format using state-of-the-art tools [4]. To extract
content from HTML resources, we focused only on HTML paragraph tags to
simplify the process and avoid noise. All available text was eventually checked
to remove strings that can hinder the classification (e.g., we removed all stop
words provided in the list of the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) [17])
In the end, all ATT&CK tactics linked to at least 80 reports and provide a
suitable dataset for the training of the classifiers. Unfortunately, this was not
the same for the techniques which presented instead an imbalance (e.g., some
techniques corresponding to just one report). We omitted all techniques that
had less than 5 reports in the dataset. This ensures that we can at least train
on 4 reports and have 1 report for testing in a 5-fold cross-validation setting.
3 Methodology overview
Considering that CTRs may refer to more than one tactic (or technique) at the
same time, the machine learning problem is a multi-class multi-label approach.
We tested both general approach to multi-label classification: i) dedicated multi-
label classifiers and ii) multiple single-label classifiers, each of which is responsible
to decide whether its class (e.g., one specific tactic) should be assigned or not.
During the evaluation, we tested several classifiers simultaneously compar-
ing different text representation methods such as term-frequency (TF) and term
frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) weighting factors [19] as well
as Word2Vec [22]. Finally, we defined several post-processing approaches to im-
prove classification results. These approaches are based on properties and char-
acteristics of the “Enterprise” ATT&CK framework. For example, we leverage
the hierarchical structure of the framework by filtering the classification results
based on a coherent matching of tactics and techniques belonging to those tac-
tics. In all experiments, we performed 5-fold cross-validation.
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3.1 Metrics
Our evaluation metrics of choice are: precision, recall, and F0.5 score. The F0.5
score represents a weighted average between the precision pi and recall ρ where
the precision is considered twice as important as the recall. The F0.5 is computed
as follows:
pi =
TP
TP + FP
, ρ =
TP
TP + FN
, F0.5 = 1 + 0.5
2 · pi · ρ
0.52pi + ρ
with TP being true positives, FP false positives and FN false negatives. We
chose F0.5 to emphasise precision over recall, i.e., the assigned labels need to be
correct (precision), but there might be labels we do not assign (recall). Finally,
we employ macro-averaging and micro-averaging [30].
3.2 Baseline
To simplify the analysis of different classification models and quickly identify
unsuccessful ones, we defined a “naive” baseline by simply attributing to each
testing instance the most frequent label of the training set. Table 1 shows the
results of this baseline.
Table 1: Naive baseline based on the attribution of the most frequent label
Majority
Micro Macro
Precision Recall F0.5 Precision Recall F0.5
Tactics 48.72% 19.00% 37.10% 4.43% 9.09% 4.93%
Techniques 9.57% 2.51% 6.11% 0.05% 0.48% 0.06%
4 Multi-label classification
As introduced in the previous section, our evaluation consists on testing different
text representation methods with several multi-label classification models.
4.1 Text representation
Our primary approach is based on standard weighting functions such as term-
frequency (TF) and term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) [19].
These weighting functions were tested employing either simple bag-of-words or
bi-grams and tri-grams. The use of TF and TF-IDF weighting functions relied
on the application of a maximum and a minimum frequency of appearance in
the overall corpus. According to the performed tests, a simple bags-of-words rep-
resentation performed better than any other grouping technique. Furthermore,
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decreasing the number of features and thus selecting half of the words with high-
est TF/TF-IDF scores outperformed both the choice of a constant number of
words for each report or not limiting the number of features at all.
Besides TF and TF-IDF, our analysis includes tests based on Word2Vec [22].
In this case, Word2Vec was trained on our dataset instead of taking advantage
of the existing pre-trained versions. This was due to some inconsistencies found
in some early results. Tests with Word2Vec were performed both averaging and
summing word vectors representing the text.
4.2 Classification models
Our analysis includes two main strategies to tackle the multi-label classification
problem: adapting state-of-the-art classification algorithms or approaching the
overall problem from a different perspective. In this last case, the approaches
are: using binary relevance and training a binary classifier for each label inde-
pendently [18], employing a classifier chain (which is similar to binary relevance
but uses the relation between labels [26]), or adopting label power sets (basi-
cally transforming them into a multi-class problems between all labels combi-
nation [29]). A power-set model is, however, difficult to apply to our case, as
we have too many labels and not enough data to cover all possible combina-
tions. Therefore, we only focus on binary relevance and classifier chains and test
different types of classifiers.
All implementations of multi-label classifiers are built on top of the Scikit-
learn library (version 0.21.3) [27]. Our tests include: multi-label K-Nearest Neigh-
bours, multi-label Decision Tree and Extra Tree techniques, and Extra Trees,
Random Forest ensemble methods for multi-label classification. For what con-
cerns binary relevance and classifier chains, we tested several linear models.
These are: Logistic Regression, Perceptron, Ridge, Bernoulli Naive Bayes classi-
fier, K-Nearest Neighbors and Linear Support Vector Machine (Linear SVC). We
also included multiple tree-based models such as: Decision Tree, Extra Tree clas-
sifiers, Random Forest, Extra Trees, AdaBoost Decision Tree, Bagging Decision
Tree and Gradient Boosting.
It is to be noted that in classification models were the correlations between
labels is used (i.e. multi-label classifiers and classifier chains), we predicted the
tactics and techniques together, with the best parameters possible for both label
types. In the cases in which the label relationship did not matter (i.e. binary
relevance), we split the classification by tactics and techniques, applying to each
the best parameters possible for their category.
To avoid overfitting, in addition to the previously mentioned reduction of
the number of features, we tested regularising models, fine-tuning the hyper-
parameters of the classifiers and aim at simple models.
As an attempt to solve the imbalance in the dataset, we used a random
resampling approach on the models with binary relevance, associated with TF
and TF-IDF. In the case of the tactics, the resampling method was a combination
of over- and undersampling for all tactics to have in their training set with
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400 positive reports and 400 negative reports. For the techniques, we randomly
sampled 125 positive reports and 500 negative reports.
4.3 Results and discussion
Tables 2 and 3 show the performance of the tactics and techniques classification,
respectively. Classifiers that are not shown in the table either did not outperform
our naive baseline or obtained overall lower results than those present.
Table 2: Classification results for tactics prediction. Abbreviations: CC = Clas-
sifier Chain, BR = Binary relevance, DT = Decision Tree, T = Tree? KNN =
K Nearest Neighbors
Without resampling With resampling
Micro Macro Micro Macro
Precision Recall F0.5 Precision Recall F0.5 Precision Recall F0.5 Precision Recall F0.5
Majority Baseline 48.72% 19.00% 37.10% 4.43% 9.09% 4.93% - - - - - -
Term Frequency
CC Adaboost DT 64.73% 50.84% 61.30% 60.87% 45.20% 56.45% - - - - - -
CC Bagging DT 67.19% 40.57% 59.38% 64.01% 33.46% 51.89% - - - - - -
CC Gradient T Boosting 71.84% 44.33% 63.61% 66.72% 37.42% 55.91% - - - - - -
CC Logistic Regression 63.81% 54.35% 61.61% 58.86% 47.78% 55.85% - - - - - -
CC Perceptron 56.34% 56.58% 56.35% 51.63% 50.79% 51.04% - - - - - -
CC Linear SVC 63.81% 51.02% 60.71% 58.89% 44.31% 54.64% - - - - - -
BR AdaBoost DT 62.30% 49.27% 59.08% 57.26% 42.37% 52.91% 49.77% 60.45% 47.08% 52.24% 65.22% 48.91%
BR Bagging DT 68.26% 42.36% 60.75% 63.71% 34.30% 51.54% 52.39% 58.59% 49.36% 54.32% 63.73% 50.48%
BR Gradient T Boosting 71.42% 48.19% 65.04% 66.35% 40.16% 56.78% 54.87% 66.41% 51.94% 57.66% 72.47% 53.92%
BR Logistic Regression 63.71% 54.42% 61.54% 58.74% 47.81% 55.76% 56.94% 61.56% 52.44% 58.66% 66.74% 53.90%
BR Ridge Classifier 61.85% 51.46% 59.39% 55.64% 45.31% 52.92% 49.93% 55.86% 45.48% 51.50% 58.97% 47.03%
BR Linear SVC 64.70% 51.55% 61.51% 59.20% 44.36% 54.89% 54.95% 57.69% 50.76% 56.45% 63.37% 51.83%
Adapted KNN 57.93% 38.66% 52.55% 52.55% 30.41% 43.06% - - - - - -
Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency
CC Adaboost DT 61.42% 49.86% 58.59% 57.71% 44.09% 53.79% - - - - - -
CC Gradient T Boosting 71.15% 43.15% 62.52% 67.40% 36.29% 54.97% - - - - - -
CC Perceptron 62.06% 54.97% 60.28% 58.05% 49.26% 54.72% - - - - - -
CC Ridge Classifier 74.40% 41.27% 63.27% 67.63% 33.31% 51.74% - - - - - -
CC Linear SVC 71.63% 44.89% 63.41% 65.70% 36.76% 54.59% - - - - - -
BR AdaBoost DT 61.02% 51.02% 58.61% 56.61% 44.67% 53.19% 49.52% 58.46% 46.12% 51.84% 63.79% 47.86%
BR Bagging DT 66.88% 41.44% 59.39% 63.92% 34.95% 52.29% 53.15% 56.68% 50.06% 54.70% 61.94% 50.87%
BR Gradient T Boosting 70.13% 46.85% 63.66% 65.08% 38.94% 55.03% 54.30% 63.40% 50.79% 56.92% 70.53% 52.48%
BR Logistic Regression 71.04% 50.70% 65.61% 59.00% 40.53% 51.21% 59.25% 63.13% 56.69% 61.09% 69.80% 57.14%
BR Perceptron 65.20% 55.35% 62.80% 60.54% 48.29% 56.24% 57.26% 62.68% 53.97% 59.28% 69.11% 54.98%
BR Ridge Classifier 72.40% 48.90% 65.83% 66.57% 38.58% 53.32% 59.47% 62.28% 55.77% 61.13% 68.89% 56.59%
BR Linear SVC 65.64% 64.69% 65.38% 60.26% 58.50% 59.47% 57.71% 66.17% 53.88% 59.97% 71.18% 55.75%
Adapted KNN 62.45% 45.24% 57.89% 57.82% 36.75% 49.63% - - - - - -
Word2Vec average
CC Adaboost DT 58.59% 44.21% 54.98% 52.69% 36.95% 47.34% - - - - - -
CC Gradient T Boosting 63.33% 42.22% 57.58% 55.10% 33.38% 47.52% - - - - - -
CC Logistic Regression 62.80% 34.15% 53.78% 55.27% 26.87% 42.63% - - - - - -
CC KNN 53.40% 51.78% 52.93% 48.15% 43.84% 45.79% - - - - - -
CC Linear SVC 62.88% 40.82% 56.75% 59.98% 34.04% 49.66% - - - - - -
BR AdaBoost DT 57.97% 46.24% 55.11% 50.77% 38.54% 46.70% - - - - - -
BR Gradient T Boosting 64.53% 44.77% 59.23% 55.65% 35.07% 46.78% - - - - - -
BR Logistic Regression 66.86% 41.94% 59.68% 61.02% 31.95% 46.17% - - - - - -
BR KNN 58.08% 51.48% 56.58% 51.80% 41.86% 47.45% - - - - - -
BR Linear SVC 64.85% 44.91% 59.49% 56.57% 35.35% 47.81% - - - - - -
Adapted KNN 57.33% 51.03% 55.92% 52.11% 41.78% 47.43% - - - - - -
Word2Vec sum
CC Adaboost DT 60.26% 43.49% 55.82% 54.81% 36.87% 48.68% - - - - - -
CC Gradient T Boosting 60.21% 40.00% 54.69% 50.19% 30.78% 43.26% - - - - - -
CC Logistic Regression 54.83% 50.41% 53.89% 49.18% 42.97% 47.26% - - - - - -
CC KNN 57.61% 48.22% 55.39% 54.82% 39.33% 47.90% - - - - - -
BR AdaBoost DT 59.75% 45.73% 56.15% 52.96% 38.41% 48.22% - - - - - -
BR Gradient T Boosting 64.54% 45.72% 59.53% 55.37% 35.96% 47.76% - - - - - -
BR Logistic Regression 58.71% 48.01% 56.13% 52.07% 42.03% 49.31% - - - - - -
BR KNN 57.70% 48.23% 55.45% 54.14% 39.26% 47.62% - - - - - -
Adapted KNN 57.58% 48.08% 55.33% 53.64% 38.95% 47.25% - - - - - -
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Table 3: Classification results for techniques prediction. Abbreviations: CC =
Classifier Chain, BR = Binary relevance, DT = Decision Tree, T = Tree, NB =
Naive Bayes
Without resampling With resampling
Micro Macro Micro Macro
Precision Recall F0.5 Precision Recall F0.5 Precision Recall F0.5 Precision Recall F0.5
Majority Baseline 9.57% 2.51% 6.11% 0.05% 0.48% 0.06% - - - - - -
Term Frequency
CC Adaboost DT 36.64% 13.27% 27.05% 18.38% 8.98% 13.72% - - - - - -
CC Bagging DT 39.95% 5.83% 18.24% 18.50% 7.90% 12.32% - - - - - -
CC Ridge Classifier 14.82% 25.59% 16.16% 10.88% 23.40% 11.66% - - - - - -
CC Decision Tree 22.44% 17.94% 21.31% 18.64% 14.98% 16.46% - - - - - -
BR AdaBoost DT 35.60% 16.04% 28.56% 18.23% 9.74% 14.23% 26.44% 23.02% 22.79% 14.65% 16.16% 12.45%
BR Bagging DT 39.30% 7.63% 21.42% 16.92% 7.53% 11.88% 26.99% 12.79% 16.81% 12.34% 15.43% 10.75%
BR Gradient T Boosting 27.60% 12.67% 22.31% 20.25% 12.72% 16.26% 18.47% 20.32% 16.73% 14.80% 24.51% 13.96%
BR Ridge Classifier 14.96% 25.96% 16.33% 10.98% 23.50% 11.74% 11.40% 31.83% 12.83% 9.05% 32.50% 10.04%
BR Linear SVC 22.87% 19.22% 21.98% 15.36% 11.39% 13.41% 17.85% 24.59% 17.97% 12.85% 17.01% 11.95%
BR Decision Tree 23.06% 18.53% 21.94% 18.00% 14.76% 16.18% 17.46% 24.90% 17.11% 14.70% 21.66% 13.61%
Adapted Decision Tree 16.23% 14.06% 15.71% 9.99% 8.27% 9.00% - - - - - -
Adapted Extra Tree 12.86% 10.10% 12.19% 6.33% 4.95% 5.55% - - - - - -
Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency
CC Adaboost DT 37.06% 13.06% 26.98% 17.70% 8.44% 13.19% - - - - - -
CC Decision Tree 23.18% 18.47% 22.02% 18.83% 14.85% 16.77% - - - - - -
BR AdaBoost DT 35.04% 14.77% 27.41% 17.23% 9.05% 13.36% 27.53% 18.12% 22.32% 14.55% 13.00% 11.85%
BR Gradient T Boosting 25.85% 11.60% 20.72% 18.83% 12.09% 15.21% 19.45% 16.76% 17.10% 15.33% 21.69% 14.38%
Logistic Regression 52.82% 3.66% 14.33% 7.86% 2.76% 5.18% 42.05% 4.98% 12.41% 7.53% 4.79% 5.64%
BR Perceptron 30.45% 18.26% 26.82% 21.89% 14.61% 18.32% 25.16% 22.56% 23.03% 19.50% 21.29% 17.32%
BR Linear SVC 37.18% 29.79% 35.02% 28.84% 22.67% 25.06% 31.16% 32.86% 29.37% 26.27% 28.05% 22.87%
BR Decision Tree 20.72% 18.31% 20.15% 16.88% 14.57% 15.55% 17.44% 22.91% 17.02% 15.45% 20.21% 14.21%
Adapted Decision Tree 14.11% 12.19% 13.65% 8.14% 7.19% 7.44% - - - - - -
Adapted Extra Tree 12.54% 9.83% 11.85% 5.70% 4.68% 5.15% - - - - - -
Word2Vec average
CC Adaboost DT 29.88% 9.29% 20.67% 9.35% 4.05% 6.70% - - - - - -
CC Linear SVC 36.21% 3.33% 11.70% 7.58% 3.60% 5.35% - - - - - -
BR AdaBoost DT 26.88% 11.79% 21.36% 9.15% 4.82% 7.31% - - - - - -
BR Perceptron 17.43% 15.88% 17.03% 8.33% 7.80% 6.37% - - - - - -
BR Bernoulli NB 10.54% 47.77% 12.47% 5.21% 22.33% 6.06% - - - - - -
BR Linear SVC 49.01% 6.33% 20.70% 8.57% 3.27% 5.64% - - - - - -
Adapted Extra Tree 12.53% 14.41% 12.85% 5.17% 5.75% 5.05% - - - - - -
Word2Vec sum
CC Adaboost DT 27.88% 7.34% 17.68% 8.77% 3.47% 6.14% - - - - - -
BR AdaBoost DT 28.34% 11.69% 21.93% 9.63% 4.50% 7.30% - - - - - -
BR Gradient T Boosting 21.14% 8.41% 16.14% 7.38% 2.96% 5.00% - - - - - -
BR Logistic Regression 20.49% 18.60% 19.98% 11.48% 10.53% 10.62% - - - - - -
BR Perceptron 16.39% 18.52% 16.77% 6.27% 7.96% 5.65% - - - - - -
BR Bernoulli NB 9.98% 49.20% 11.86% 5.10% 23.51% 5.93% - - - - - -
BR Linear SVC 11.64% 22.82% 12.87% 8.30% 15.49% 8.42% - - - - - -
Adapted Decision Tree 513.39% 14.23% 13.51% 5.63% 5.73% 5.42% - - - - - -
When we compare the text representation methods, we can observe that,
overall, models using Word2Vec either with a sum or an averaging of the word
vectors, underperformed compared to the ones using a TF or TF-IDF weighting
system. We observed minor differences in the use of the average against the sum
of the vector in the Word2Vec approach, but we cannot claim that one way is
better than the other as the results depend on the employed classifier.
Considering the results of the different classifiers, we can see that adapted al-
gorithms tend to underperform compared to the classifier chains and the binary
relevance models, for both tactics and techniques predictions. Overall, the clas-
sification made with binary relevance instead of classifier chain performs slightly
better, which means that the relationship between labels did not have as much
impact as expected.
Some classifiers stand out among the others for each type of labels. For
the classification by tactics, the AdaBoost Decision Tree, the Gradient Tree
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Boosting, Perceptron and the Linear SVC in classifier chains or binary relevance
models have the best performance, independently from using TF-IDF or TF. The
Bagging Decision tree, the Ridge classifier and the Logistic Regression perform
well when used in binary relevance. They also perform well in a classifier chain if
Logistic Regression and the Bagging Decision Tree classify text use TF weighting
and the Ridge classifier use TF-IDF. Similar models work as well for techniques
prediction, in addition to the Decision Tree classifier with binary relevance or
classifier chain models.
The resampling on the tactics prediction resulted in an overall increase of
the recall, but also a decrease in precision and, thus, in F0.5 score. Only a few
models (e.g. Extra Trees and Random Forest) improve because of the resampling.
The Logistic Regression model does also increase its F0.5 macro-averaged score
when paired with TF-IDF, which is the maximum obtained in the resampling
evaluation. On the techniques prediction, similarly, the recall increases, while the
precision and the F0.5 score decrease. The only improvements in performance are
for models which performed very poorly without resampling.
Even though all metrics are essential, we want to give equal importance to
each label. Thus looking at the macro-averaged F0.5 scores, the binary relevance
Linear SVC with a TF-IDF weighted text representation stands out compared
to the other models, for both tactics and techniques predictions.
5 Post-processing of classification results
From the analysis presented in the previous section, we select the binary rele-
vance Linear SVC model with TF-IDF weighted bag-of-words. To improve its
results, we now try to take advantage of different properties of the “Enterprise”
ATT&CK framework such as the relationships between tactics and techniques.
It is worth noting that, an effect of this property might have already been tested
in classification models involving classifier chains. However, this issue does not
concern the selected SVC model that can, therefore, benefit from this additional
information.
5.1 Undertaken approaches
Relationships between tactics and techniques Given the relationship be-
tween each technique and the tactic it belongs to, we use this property of the
framework in the following ways:
Direct mapping from techniques to tactics This approach defines the tactics of
a report based on the classification over the techniques. Because each technique
belongs to one or more tactics, we can consider simple post-processing rules
adding tactics to labels. For example, if a technique Te1 is a label of a given
report and Te1 belongs to tactic Ta1, then Ta1 is also a label of the report.
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Tactics as features Since the prediction of techniques underperformed the one
on tactics, we can use the results from the classification by tactics to improve
the one by techniques. In this case, we use the results of the tactics prediction as
features for the classification by techniques. This is close to the classifier chain
method, but it solely uses the tactics prediction to influence the techniques one.
Confidence propagation Here, we want to use the method described in Ayoade et
al. [2] (as well as Wu et al.’s work [32]). The idea behind this approach is to use
the confidence score of each technique and the confidence score of the associated
tactics to create boosting factors. Each boosting factors are multiplied to each
associated tactic confidence score, and this ensemble is added to the pre-existing
technique confidence score. Based on the associated tactics confidence score, the
techniques’ confidence score increases or decreases, thus impacting the final pre-
dictions. To apply this method, it is worth noting that, Scikit-learn’s Linear SVC
required us to use the decision function scores instead of the confidence scores
of the classifier as directly normalising the confidence scores (not automatically
performed in the library) would have worsened model’s performance.
Input:
R /* report */{
TaRi , ...T e
R
k
}
/* all tactics and techniques predicted as being
present in the R */
Tex /* one of the techniques */
Tay /* one of the tactics */
p(Tex ∈ R) /* the probability of Tex being predicted for R */
p(Tay ∈ R) /* the probability of Tay being predicted for R */
Output:{
TaRi , ...T e
R
k
}
/* updated ensemble of tactics and techniques being
present in the R */
Data:
th ∈ R /* classification threshold */
a, b, c, d ∈ R /* defined thresholds */
begin
if Tex → Tay then
if p(Tex ∈ R) > a > th and b < p(Tay ∈ R) < th then{
TaRi , ...T e
R
k
}
+ = Tay /* adding Tay to the ensemble of
tactics and techniques being present in the R */
if th < p(Tex ∈ R) < c and p(Tay ∈ R) < d < th then{
TaRi , ...T e
R
k
}− = Tex /* removing Tex to the ensemble of
tactics and techniques being present in the R */
Algorithm 1. Hanging node approach
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Hanging node This approach is based on the observation that for 30% of the
techniques predicted in a report, not all related tactics were predicted, meaning
that either the techniques or the tactics were incorrectly identified. The analysis
of the distribution of the confidences’ frequency shows that false predictions tend
to be closer to the “successful” classification threshold (especially when it comes
to tactics). The Hanging node approach tries to leverage this aspect by consid-
ering all confidence scores when adding tactics or removing techniques from the
labels. As presented in Algorithm 1, for a connected pair “tactic-technique”, if
the technique is predicted with a high confidence score, while the tactic is not
predicted, but with a confidence score close to the classification threshold th,
then we can add the tactic to the tactics and techniques labeling the report. On
the contrary, if the techniques are present, with a confidence score near to the
classification threshold th and the tactic is not predicted for the report, with
a low confidence score, then we can remove the techniques from the predicted
labels. The thresholds a, b, c, d were defined after testing different values and
comparing the improvement in classification performance.
According to our tests, a classification threshold of th = 0.5 and thresholds
a = 0.55, b = 0.05, c = 0.95, d = 0.30, allow the highest macro-averaged
F0.5 score. As we use the Linear SVC from Scikit-learn, we defined the confi-
dence score by scaling the decision function scores using min-max scaling with
min = − 1 and max = 1.
Further similar strategies based on relationships between techniques and tac-
tics are difficult to implement, as several techniques correspond to the same tac-
tics. Adding a technique if a related tactic is also present in the report would be
misguided, as the high probability could be due to another technique. Similarly,
removing a tactic, if a related technique is absent, would be disadvantageous for
basically the same reason.
Relationships between techniques Always based on the ATT&CK frame-
work structure, we can compute joint probabilities between a couple of tech-
niques based on their common appearances within the same malware, tool or
group. Using these probabilities, we decided to test three different methods to
improve techniques predictions.
Rare association rules This approach follows the work of Benites and Sapozh-
nikova [5], based on a selection of association rules between techniques. The
first step is to calculate the Kulczynski measure [15] for each pair of techniques.
These values are forming a curve from which we can determine the variance. If
this variance is low, the threshold to decide on the pairing rules based on their
Kulczynski measure is based on the median of differences between neighbour
values. If this variance is high, it is based on the average of the values slightly
lower than the mean of this curve.
Steiner tree association rules This approach has been described by Soni et
al. [28], and focuses on a formulation of the label coherence as a Steiner Tree Ap-
proximation problem [10]. Once the techniques prediction is performed, for each
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report, we create a directed tree [21] in which edges have weights corresponding
to the conditional probabilities between the two nodes and the direction is given
by the following criterion:
{
Tei → Tej , p(Tei|Tej) ≤ p(Tej |Tei),
T ei ← Tej , otherwise.
Then, we use Edmond’s algorithm [8] to obtain a reduced tree and a limited
number of connections between techniques. Based on the predictions of the clas-
sification, we search the graph for techniques which descend from the predicted
techniques with the K highest weights. In our tests, we found that K = 15 is
the value maximizing the success of this pre-processing strategy.
Knapsack This approach also comes from the paper of Soni et al. [28] but, this
time, the authors consider the label assignment as a resource allocation problem.
In this case, we solve the 0-1 Knapsack problem [20], in which a new label is
selected if its conditional probability (based on the predicted labels) increases
the overall log-likelihood.
5.2 Results and discussion
Table 4 shows the final results of all our post-processing approaches. To better
investigate the effects of post-processing approaches we also applied those assum-
ing a perfect match of techniques (when predicting the tactics) and vice-versa
(Table 5). For all results, we use a new baseline given by the pure classification
without any post-processing.
Table 4: Comparison of post-processing approaches for tactics and techniques.
Approaches
Micro Macro
Precision Recall F0.5 Precision Recall F0.5
Tactics
Inde. 65.64% ±3.76% 64.69% ±3% 65.38% ±2.87% 60.26% ±3.2% 58.50% ±3.68% 59.47% ±2.29%
1.a. 63.32% ±6.42% 52.34% ±5.08% 60.45% ±3.8% 57.49% ±5.41% 47.94% ±5.87% 54.59% ±3%
1.d. 59.60% ±2.89% 68.04% ±3.06% 61.08% ±3.42% 54.41% ±2.97% 61.28% ±3.12% 55.42% ±3.2%
Techniques
Inde. 37.18% ±6.75% 29.79% ±5.91% 35.02% ±5.32% 28.84% ±6.9% 22.67% ±5.94% 25.06% ±6.09%
1.b. 31.55% ±5% 35.17% ±6% 31.97% ±4.31% 24.70% ±6.29% 22.74% ±6.3% 22.38% ±5.72%
1.c. 33.07% ±7.11% 38.17% ±5.41% 33.69% ±6.2% 28.14% ±6.72% 28.19% ±4.99% 26.06% ±5.69%
1.d. 32.19% ±6.05% 29.27% ±6.2% 31.34% ±5.23% 32.35% ±6.68% 22.21% ±4.89% 27.52% ±6.03%
2.a. 33.70% ±6.79% 36.26% ±5.16% 33.89% ±5.76% 28.08% ±6.8% 25.18% ±5.22% 25.20% ±5.78%
2.b. 37.06% ±6.77% 29.79% ±5.99% 34.93% ±5.34% 28.84% ±6.94% 22.67% ±5.91% 25.06% ±6.11%
2.c. 33.98% ±5.92% 33.88% ±6% 33.68% ±%5.02 28.38% ±6.88% 23.60% ±5.9% 24.80% ±6.06%
When it comes to tactics prediction, the independent classification is the
best. This might be related to the fact that techniques predictions had worse
results than tactics ones and thus any post-processing depending on these last
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Table 5: Comparison of post-processing approaches for tactics and techniques
(considering a perfect techniques and tactics predictions respectively).
Approaches
Micro Macro
Precision Recall F0.5 Precision Recall F0.5
Tactics
Inde. 65.64% ±3.76% 64.69% ±3% 65.38% ±2.87% 60.26% ±3.2% 58.50% ±3.68% 59.47% ±2.29%
1.a. 100% ±0% 100% ±0% 100% ±0% 100% ±0% 100% ±0% 100% ±0%
1.d. 68.09% ±4.02% 72.37% ±2.97% 68.84% ±3.24% 63.32% ±3.1% 66.29% ±4% 63.54% ±2.08%
Techniques
Inde. 37.18% ±6.75% 29.79% ±5.91% 35.02% ±5.32% 28.84% ±6.9% 22.67% ±5.94% 25.06% ±6.09%
1.b. 51.54% ±5.01% 55.90% ±4.23% 52.24% ±4.4% 41.05% ±3.94% 39.04% ±5.13% 38.35% ±3.16%
1.c. 36.51% ±8% 48.75% ±4.13% 38.14% ±7.54% 34.21% ±7.43% 37.12% ±4.13% 32.36% ±6.24%
1.d. 38.40% ±7% 28.39% ±6.14% 35.44% ±5.42% 29.14% ±7.1% 22.40% ±6.22% 25.23% ±6.37%
could decrease results on the tactics. However, considering a perfect techniques
prediction, both post-processing approaches would help improve the tactics clas-
sification. The approach “Direct mapping from techniques to tactics” would have
a perfect performance, as it is purely rule-based. However, it is unlikely that the
techniques prediction would improve without the tactic prediction improving.
Because of that, approach “Hanging node” seems to be the most promising ap-
proach to improve the independent classification.
For what concerns techniques prediction, the independent classification started
with a lower baseline. The use of the approaches “Confidence propagation” and
“Hanging node” are likely possible improvements. In all cases, except for the
approach “Hanging node”, the F0.5 score changed mainly due to lower precision
and increased recall related to the addition of techniques to the predicted set. In
this case, the F0.5 score increasing in “Hanging node” is especially interesting, as
it is due to the decrease of false-positive and, thus, the increase of the precision.
Approaches relying on the relationship between techniques are close to the
classification without post-processing. From these results, we conclude that these
approaches might not well adapt to our problem or to the data we use. Approach
“Rare association rules” could probably fit better in a hierarchical environment
with known conditional probabilities. It is also possible that the ground truth
we used is incomplete, as, even though it is based on data collected and analysed
by experts, it represents only a sample of malware, tools and campaigns being
observed in the past years.
If tactics prediction were perfect, and without any change in the prediction
of techniques, approach “Tactics as features” would have the highest score for
all metrics. Once again, we cannot choose an approach based on this test and
the results from Table 5, since the techniques prediction would probably improve
with the perfect tactics prediction. However, since all approaches are better or
equal than the independent classification, we conclude that post-processing is
needed for techniques prediction. It is worth noting that, approach “Hanging
node” is barely higher than the independent classification compared to “Con-
fidence propagation”, while the opposite is true in the actual tests. Approach
“Hanging node” also presents worse results when the tactics prediction is per-
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fect. For this reason, we conclude that approach “Confidence propagation” might
likely overperform “Hanging node”. Furthermore, “Hanging node” and “Confi-
dence propagation” approaches carry on very different strategies and, from our
testing, they seem targeting different types of techniques. “Hanging node” seems
to affect very little, but efficiently, the results from the independent classification
and only modifies results of the techniques with the highest number of reports.
“Confidence propagation” targets any techniques and modify many predictions,
which would potentially improve the classification for the hard-to-predict tech-
niques. However, from our observation, this approach succeeds almost as often
as it fails, thus worsening the prediction of some labels while improving the
prediction of others.
At the end of the evaluation, we are not in a position to draw conclusive
proves for precisely ranking the described post-processing methods. Based on
the analysis of the results, not using any post-processing method for the tactics
classification is probably a safe choice. For what concerns the techniques, we
believe that one among “Confidence propagation” and “Hanging node” would
likely improve the independent classification. In what follows, within our tool,
we decided to implement both approaches but to use “Hanging node” as default
due to its better results in our current dataset. However, in case of retraining on
a new dataset, the tool will be compare results coming from the two approaches
and dynamically choose the one that best perform.
6 rcATT
One important contribution of our research was to implement our findings in a
tool that would allow security experts to automate the analysis of CTRs. We
call our tool rcATT, as for “reports classification by adversarial tactics and tech-
niques”. Based on the previous two sections, we decided to implement a classifi-
cation that uses a TF-IDF weighted bag-of-words text representation with a bi-
nary relevance Linear SVC. This classification is followed with a post-processing
performed either via the hanging node approach or the confidence propagation
one (depending on the training data).
Figure 2 illustrate tools’ main functional building blocks. From a cyber threat
report, in a text format, entered by the users, our trained model predicts dif-
ferent tactics and techniques. The user will be able to visualize the results and
the confidence score associated with each prediction, either based on the Min-
Max scaling of the decision function score from the classifier or the re-evaluation
score, based on the post-processing method. When users do not agree with the
results, they can change them. In all cases, new results can be saved with the old
training data (the original labelled cyber threat reports) so to be used to train
the classifier again. The retraining of the classifier must be activated manually
by the user. This is done to avoid automated retraining that might slow down
the tool or mistakenly involve unwanted data. As already mentioned, during the
retraining, the tool also autonomously choose which post-processing method to
use to maximize predictions results. This approach involves also the dynamic
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Fig. 2: Organisation of rcATT.
definition of specific thresholds (e.g., the one related to the hanging node meth-
ods).
Classification results can be saved in a JSON file using STIX format. This
later allows any other tool to easily access all identified tactics and techniques.
General information about the predictions is exported in a STIX “Report” object
(e.g., title of the original report, dates, etc.). The “description” property of the
report object represents the original content of the CTR. Most important, all
prediction results (as well as any prediction added by the users) are available
using the specific identification numbers available within the STIX version of the
ATT&CK framework and linked to the Report object using the “object refs”
property.
Finally, the tool works with two graphic modes: command-line and graphical
interface (Figure 3). The command-line version of the tool is meant to be efficient
to use (e.g., cases in which the user want to predict TTPs from a large number
of CTRs). The graphical interface is interactive and allows users to modify clas-
sification results and save the changes to the training set and thus give feedback
to the tool.
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Fig. 3: rcATT graphical interface.
7 Related work and comparison with similar approaches
The vast majority of existing scientific work on the automated analysis of (un-
structured) CTRs concerns the extraction of IOCs [16,34]. Further related work
looks at other unstructured sources, like hacker forums, to extract insights on
adversarial tools [6], or on more general security vulnerabilities [24] and related
concepts [14,25].
Only few research papers aim to retrieve TTPs in unstructured data, as we
do. One of them was written by Zhu et al. [33] and presents FeatureSmith, a
tool that mines the security literature to learn features for training machine
learning classifiers to detect Android malware. FeatureSmith is specifically tai-
lored to the task of malware detection and cannot be easily generalized to other
other settings. In contrast, our focus lies on the automated extraction of general
ATT&CK tactics and techniques.
TTPDrill [11] and ActionMiner [12], developed by Husari et al., but also the
tool by Ayoade et al. [2] are the closest tools to ours, as they extract threat
actions from CTRs in order to link them to specific ATT&CK tactics and tech-
niques. The biggest problem with those works is, however, that their achieved
results cannot be reproduced by the scientific community at large as their used
datasets or their tools are not openly available. In fact, [2] reports a big differ-
ence in accuracy when running TTPDrill [11] on their own (closed) datasets in
comparison to the accuracy achieved on the (closed) dataset as reported in [11].
Due to the closed source nature of these works, these inconsistencies cannot be
explained and motivate our open study on the extraction of TTPs from CTRs. In
comparison to all related work, our approach is described for easy reproducibil-
ity by only using open data and by making our final tool publicly available as
open source.
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On the conceptual level, however, there are also some key differences between
the above-stated approaches and ours. First of all, TTPDrill [11] uses a different
classification approach without a clear separation among tactics and techniques
(treated as similar labels). In this regard, Ayoade et al. [2] describe a more similar
approach, clearly separating tactics and techniques, despite not implementing a
fully-contained tool in the end. Both tools employ different classifier and/or
pre-processing approaches with respect to the ones implemented within rcATT.
Finally, none of the two works allow users to feedback results back to the tool
making any improvement impossible. Again, due to the lack of open-source code
or used datasets (as well as any detailed description on how to re-implement
their solutions), any further comparison on classification results is not possible.
A different tool, called Unfetter Insight, was instead available on Github [31].
Despite lacking a comprehensive description (e.g., publication) that allows a
qualitative analysis with respect to rcATT, we could in this case carry out a
quantitative comparisong between the classification results. Unfetter Insight has
been developed to detect possible ATT&CK tactics and techniques within re-
ports in TXT, PDF or HTML format. Based on our understanding of the code,
the detection is implemented by the Babelfish software created by W. Kins-
man in 2017. This software learns topics from a wiki-like corpus and retrieve
the presence of those topics in a document. The tool creates text convolutions
from unknown documents, identifying those having a good overlap with the ones
presented in the corpus. Based on the term frequency of the vocabulary in the
selected convolutions, tactics and techniques are predicted using a binary rele-
vance Multinomial Naive Bayes classifier. It is finally worth noting that Unfetter
Insight assumptions for the models are quite different with respect to the ones
used in rcATT. In fact, we base our classification on a training set of labelled
reports while they use a dictionary-like learning set. For this reason, we could
not add our training set without compromising the concept behind Babelfish.
Therefore, we decided to proceed with a comparison by using their training set
within both solutions6.
Table 6 presents the classification results of rcATT and Unfetter Insight
on identical training set and dataset. The table shows that Unfetter Insight
underperforms in the majority of the proposed metrics and overperforms only
in the one we considered the least important in our first assumptions.
6 Interestingly, their wiki-like corpus is, in fact, the content of the ATT&CK website
with the techniques definitions, and thus a subset of our dataset.
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Table 6: Comparison between rcATT and Unfetter Insight.
Tools
Micro Macro
Precision Recall F0.5 Precision Recall F0.5
Tactics
rcATT 79.31% 12.20% 37.75% 81.73% 8.21% 23.23%
Unfetter
insight
19.09% 26.76% 20.25% 19.17% 23.14% 19.28%
Techniques
rcATT 72.22% 2.07% 9.30% 20.60% 4.33% 10.11%
Unfetter
insight
3.54% 1.11% 2.46% 1.31% 0.64% 0.74%
8 Conclusion
With its constant growth, CTI sharing has become an essential activity of the
security lifecycle. Despite this, security teams around the world still face the
challenge of handling huge amount of threat intelligence data. Above all, dealing
with unstructured data remain a cumbersome and time-consuming task.
The work presented in this paper aims at simplifying this task by enabling
automated extraction of valuable CTI information, namely Tactics, Techniques
and Procedures (TTPs), from textual cyber security reports. Our approach takes
a cue from the ones of Ayoade et al. [2] and Husari et al. [11] and investigates
text multi-label classification techniques that can fulfill the aforementioned goal.
Additionally, we propose approaches for post-processing classification results and
improving classifiers’ overall performance in terms of precision and recall. By
taking advantage of our training dataset, the MITRE ATT&CK framework, we
show that relationships among the chosen classification labels, the framework’s
tactics and techniques, can help refining the classification and decreasing the
number false-positives.
Based on our findings, we developed rcATT, an interactive tool for the au-
tomated analysis of cyber threat reports. The tool aims at supporting secu-
rity experts to dig into human-readable data and extract ATT&CK tactics and
techniques that most likely describe the content of the text. rcATT gives users
the possibility to dinamically adjust or fix the classification results and, conse-
quently, feedback the internal classifier with correct information, improving its
performance over time.
The tool has been tested and compared with state-of-the-art approaches dis-
cussed in literature or already available as open-source solutions. Results of
these comparisons show rcATT competitiveness and validate the research di-
rections foreseen within our work. Finally, rcATT has been recently integrated
into tool-chains of real operational corporate Computer Emergency Response
Teams (CERTs) to support Threat Intelligence sharing and analytics processes.
This last experience further confirms the importance of researches of this kind
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and their likely impact in broader contexts such as automated incident handling
and response.
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